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Abstract
Digital provenance describes the ancestry or history of a
digital object. Most existing provenance systems, how-
ever, operate at only one level of abstraction: the sys-
tem call layer, a workﬂow speciﬁcation, or the high-level
constructs of a particular application. The provenance
collectable in each of these layers is different, and all of
it can be important. Single-layer systems fail to account
for the different levels of abstraction at which users need
to reason about their data and processes. These systems
cannot integrate data provenance across layers and can-
not answer questions that require an integrated view of
the provenance.
We have designed a provenance collection structure
facilitating the integration of provenance across multi-
ple levels of abstraction, including a workﬂow engine,
a web browser, and an initial runtime Python prove-
nance tracking wrapper. We layer these components atop
provenance-aware network storage (NFS) that builds
upon a Provenance-Aware Storage System (PASS). We
discuss the challenges of building systems that integrate
provenance across multiple layers of abstraction, present
how we augmented systems in each layer to integrate
provenance, and present use cases that demonstrate how
provenance spanning multiple layers provides function-
ality not available in existing systems. Our evaluation
shows that the overheads imposed by layering prove-
nance systems are reasonable.
1 Introduction
In digital systems, provenance is the record of the cre-
ation and modiﬁcation of an object. Provenance pro-
vides answers to questions such as: How does the an-
cestry of two objects differ? Are there source code ﬁles
tainted by proprietary software? How was this object
created? Most existing provenance systems operate at
a single level of abstraction at which they identify and
record provenance. Application-level systems, such as
Trio [29], record provenance at the semantic level of
the application – tuples for a database system. Other
application-level solutions record provenance at the level
of business objects, lines of source code, or other units
with semantic meaning to the application. Service-
oriented workﬂow (SOA) approaches [8, 9, 23], typically
associated with workﬂow engines, record provenance at
the level of workﬂow stages and data or message ex-
changes. System-call-based systems such as ES3 [3],
TREC [28], and PASS [21] operate at the level commu-
nicated via system calls – processes and ﬁles. In all of
these cases, provenance increases the value of the data it
describes.
While the provenance collected at each level of ab-
straction is useful in its own right, integration across
these layers is crucial but currently absent. Without
a uniﬁed provenance infrastructure, individual compo-
nents produce islands of provenance with no way to re-
late provenance from one layer to another. The most
valuable provenance is that which is collected at the layer
that provides user-meaningful names. If users reason in
terms of ﬁle names, then a system such as PASS that
operates at the ﬁle system level is appropriate. If users
want to reason about abstract datasets manipulated by a
workﬂow, then a workﬂow engine’s provenance is ap-
propriate. As layers interoperate, the layers that name
objects produce provenance, transmitting it to other lay-
ers and forming relationships with the objects at those
different layers. For example, this might associate many
ﬁles that comprise a data set with the single object rep-
resenting the data set. PASS captures provenance trans-
parently without application modiﬁcation, but it might
not capture an object’s semantics. If applications encap-
sulate that semantic knowledge, then those applications
require modiﬁcation to transmit that knowledge to PASS.
In summary, application and system provenance provide
different beneﬁts; the value of the union of this prove-
nance is greater than the sum of its parts.Figure 1: Example of a layered architecture introduced in Section 1. This scenario demonstrates a workﬂow
application running on a workstation, but accessing its inputs and outputs on remote ﬁle servers. The workﬂow
engine, local ﬁle system, and remote ﬁle system all capture provenance, but only by integrating that provenance can
we respond to queries that require complete ancestry of an object.
Consider the scenario in Figure 1. A workﬂow en-
gine running on a workstation reads input ﬁles from an
NFS-mounted ﬁle system, runs a workﬂow that produces
intermediate ﬁles stored on the the workstation’s disk,
and ultimately produces three output ﬁles that are stored
on a second NFS-mounted ﬁle system. Imagine that we
run the workﬂow on Monday, and unbeknownst to us,
a colleague modiﬁes one of the input ﬁles on Tuesday.
When we run the workﬂow on Wednesday, we ﬁnd that
it produces different results. If we capture provenance
only on the local or remote ﬁle systems, we cannot see
any of the processing stages that occur inside the work-
ﬂow engine. If we capture provenance inside the work-
ﬂow engine, then we lose track of the fact that one of
the inputs to the workﬂow changed, since it changed in
a manner transparent to the workﬂow engine (on a re-
mote server). Properly tracing the ancestry of the output
ﬁle requires the full provenance chain: from one remote
server through the local system and workﬂow engine to
another remote server.
This example illustrates the challenges that we en-
countered in developing a layered provenance architec-
ture. We will use this example throughout the rest of the
paper to discuss these challenges and describe our solu-
tions to them. We describe the PASSv2 system, a new
version of PASS that enables the seamless integration
of provenance from different layers of abstraction. In
such a layered system, data and provenance ﬂow together
through the different layers. The resulting system pro-
vides a uniﬁed provenance infrastructure allowing users
to get answers to queries that span layers of abstraction,
including information about objects in different applica-
tions, the local ﬁle system, remote ﬁle systems, and even
those downloaded from the Web. Furthermore, the sys-
tem allows an arbitrary number of layers to stack on each
other (we demonstrate a three layer stack in Section 7).
The contributions of this work are:
 Use cases demonstrating the utility of integrating
provenance-aware applications and a provenance-
aware operating system.
 An architecture for provenance-aware systems that
integrates provenance across multiple abstraction
layers.
 A prototype demonstrating the capabilities of this
layered architecture through the creation of an inte-
grated set of provenance-aware components: NFS,
a workﬂow engine, a browser (links), and an ini-
tial runtime Python provenance tracking wrapper.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: In
Section 2, we place this work in the context of exist-
ing systems and introduce the idea of integrating prove-
nance across semantic layers in a system. In Sec-
tion 3, we present use cases that highlight the beneﬁtsof layering. In Section 4, we discuss the fundamen-
tal challenges inherent in building systems that integrate
provenance across multiple layers, and in Section 5, we
present our layered architecture, demonstrating how it
addresses these challenges. In Section 6, we describe
the provenance-aware applications and remote ﬁle server
we developed. Section 7 presents the cost of providing
these features in terms of time and space overheads. In
Section 8, we discuss related work, and we conclude in
Section 9.
2 Background
Previous work exists at each of the layers discussed in
the introduction, but there is no approach that integrates
across the different levels of abstraction to provide a uni-
ﬁed solution.
At the domain-speciﬁc level, systems like GenePat-
tern [10] provide provenance for environments in which
biologists perform routine analyses. Experiments done
within the analysis environment record and maintain in-
formation about the particular algorithms and parameters
used, but this information can be lost if data is manipu-
lated outside of the environment.
Tracking provenance at the level provided by work-
ﬂow engines – such as Pasoa [23], Chimera [9], and Ke-
pler [2] – allows users to group collection of related ob-
jects into single logical entities. For example, scientists
frequently refer to logical data sets containing hundreds
or thousands of individual ﬁles. These systems can an-
swer queries such as: What were all the output ﬁles of
a particular experiment? or What version of the soft-
ware release are we using for this analysis? These sys-
tems lose some of the semantic knowledge available at
the domain-speciﬁc level, but do provide the ability to
handle abstractions such as data sets.
System level solutions like ES3 [3] and PASSv1 [21]
capture information at the operating system level, losing
both the semantic information of domain-speciﬁc solu-
tions and also the relationships among data sets and pro-
cessing units found in workﬂow engines. However, these
systems provide a wealth of information about the envi-
ronment in which objects are created, such as the speciﬁc
binaries, libraries, and kernel modules in use.
Provenance is not the same as a security label, and
provenance systems are different from label-based se-
curity systems such as HiStar [31], Asbestos [6], and
Flume [18]. These systems track information ﬂow but
not in sufﬁcient detail for general provenance querying.
ES3 and PASSv1 capture not only the fact of relation-
ships among data sets but also the means, including data
such as process arguments and environment variables,
and support queries over this information.
All of these solutions fundamentally fail to account for
the different levels of abstraction at which users need to
reason about their data and processes. Users should be
able to work at any or all levels as desired, rather than
being limited to one. This requires being able to relate
objects that appear in one layer to their manifestations in
other layers.
It seems that perhaps it is sufﬁcient for each system
to generate its own provenance independently and then
use the names of objects to link the layers together, as
by a relational join. However, the Second Provenance
Challenge [25] showed that even at a single level of ab-
straction, uniform object naming is both fundamental to
provenance interoperability and nontrivial. Across ab-
straction boundaries, it is harder yet. For example, an
object that exists in one layer may in other layers have
some local manifestation, such as a collection of ﬁles
forming a data set, but no clearly deﬁned name. Thus,
using only object names or identiﬁers is not sufﬁcient.
Providing a uniform basis for object identity and link-
age requires an integrated provenance solution with ex-
plicit layer support, where data moving from one layer to
the next carries its provenance with it.
3 Use Cases
We have explored provenance collection in a variety of
different contexts ranging from NFS to web browsers.
We began with NFS, as a large number of users store
their data on network-attached storage. Developing
provenance-aware NFS (PA-NFS) helped us understand
how to extend provenance outside a single machine.
Next, we decided to explore integrating a provenance-
aware workﬂow engine with PASSv2 as most prior
provenance systems operated at the level of a workﬂow
engine [2, 9, 23]. We selected the Kepler open-source
workﬂow enactment engine [2] in which to explore in-
tegrating workﬂow provenance with PASSv2. We then
explored adding provenance collection to an application
that bears little similarity to workﬂow engines and op-
erating systems: a web browser. We used the links text
based web browser for this purpose. Last, we built a set
of Python wrappers to capture provenance for Python ap-
plications.
In this section, we present scenarios and differentiate
the problems that provenance-aware systems can address
with and without layering.
3.1 Provenance Aware NFS
Use Case: Finding the Source of Anomalies
Scenario: Implementing the scenario depicted in Figure
1, we use Kepler to execute the Provenance Challengeworkﬂow [24], reading inputs from one NFS ﬁle server
and writing outputs to another. Between two executions,
unbeknownst to us someone modiﬁes an input ﬁle. When
we examine the new output, we see that it is different
from the old output, and we would like to understand
why.
Without Layering: If we examine only the Kepler
provenance, we would think that the two executions were
identical, since the change in the input ﬁle is invisible to
Kepler. If we examine only the PASSv2 provenance, we
would see that there was a different input to the Kepler
workﬂow, but we would not know for sure that the input
was actually used to produce the output since we cannot
see how the multiple inputs and outputs are related.
With Layering: If Kepler runs on PASSv2, then the
PASSv2 provenance store contains the provenance from
both systems. Hence, it is possible to both determine and




Scenario: A professor is preparing a presentation and
has a number of graphs and quotes that have been pre-
viously downloaded from the Web. She copies these ob-
jects into the directory containing the presentation. Now,
she would like to include proper attribution for them, but
none remain in the browser’s history and some of them
are no longer even accessible on the Web.
Without Layering: Any browser can record the URL
and name of a downloaded ﬁle and, when the site is re-
visited, can verify if the ﬁle has changed. (In fact, this
is how most browser caches function.) However, if the
user moves, renames, or copies the ﬁle, the browser loses
the connection between the ﬁle and its provenance. The
provenance collected by PASSv2 alone is insufﬁcient as
it only records the fact that the ﬁle was downloaded by
the browser.
With Layering: A provenance-aware browser generates
provenance records that include the URL of the down-
loaded ﬁle and transmits them to PASSv2 when it writes
the ﬁle to disk. PASSv2 ensures that the ﬁle and its
provenance stay connected even if it was renamed or
copied. Our absent-minded professor can now determine
the browser provenance for the ﬁle included in the pre-
sentation.
Use Case: Determining Malware Source
Scenario: Suppose Alice downloaded a codec from a
web site. Suppose further that Eve, unbeknownst to Al-
ice, has hacked the web site and caused this codec to
contain malware. Alice later discovers that her computer
has been infected. She would like to be able to ﬁnd the
origin of the malware and the extent of the damage.
Without Layering: Alice can traverse the provenance
graph recorded by PASSv2 (similar to Backtracker [17]
and Taser [11]) to identify and remove the malware bina-
ries and recover any corrupted ﬁles. However, PASSv2
by itself cannot identify the web site from which the mal-
ware was downloaded. Conversely, a provenance-aware
browser can identify the web site from which a known
malware ﬁle was downloaded, but it cannot track the
spread of that malware through the ﬁle system.
WithLayering: Aprovenance-awarebrowserintegrated
with PASSv2 can help identify the web site that Al-
ice was visiting when malware was downloaded, any
linked third party site where the malware download orig-
inated, aswell asother details aboutthe browsing session
(for example, the user may have been redirected from a
trusted site). It can also ﬁnd other ﬁles and descendants
of ﬁles downloaded from the same web site, which may
now be suspect. Layering with PASSv2 also provides an
extra level of protection. The malware can compromise
the browser, but to hide the fact that it was ever on the
system, it also needs to compromise the operating sys-
tem. If the operating system is compromised, we can en-
sure the integrity of the provenance collected before the
compromise by using a selective versioning secure disk
system [27].
3.3 Provenance-Aware Python
Use Case: Determining Data Origin
Scenario: Through approximately 400 experiments on
60 specimens over the course of a week, colleagues in
Iowa State’s Thermography Research Group developed
a set of data quantitatively relating crack heating to the
vibrational stresses on the crack. The experiment logs
for these data were stored in a series of XML ﬁles by the
team’s data acquisition system. A team member devel-
oped a Python script to plot crack heating as a function
of crack length for two different classiﬁcations of vibra-
tional stress. Our goal was to determine the sources of
the speciﬁc XML data ﬁles that contributed to each plot.
Without Layering: This might have been a simple prob-
lem for PASSv2, except that the analysis program reads
in all the XML data ﬁles to determine which ones to use.
PASSv2 reports that the plot derives from all the XML
ﬁles. Provenance-AwarePythonknowswhichXMLdoc-
uments were actually used, but it does not know the
source ﬁles of those documents.
With Layering: In a layered Provenance-Aware
Python/PASSv2 system, queries over the provenance of
the resulting plot can report both the precise XML doc-
uments, the ﬁles from which they came, and the prove-nance of those ﬁles.
Use Case: Process Validation
Scenario: They upgraded the Python libraries on one of
their analysis machines, introducing bugs in a calculation
routine used to estimate crack heating temperatures. The
group discovered this bug after running the experiments
and wanted to identify the results that were affected by
the erroneous routine.
Without Layering: PASSv2 can distinguish which out-
put ﬁles were generated using the new Python library,
but cannot determine which of those ﬁles were generated
by invoking the erroneous routine. Provenance-Aware
Python can determine which ﬁles were generated by in-
voking the calculation routine, but cannot tell which ver-
sion of Python library was used.
With Layering: Integrating the provenance collected by
PA-Python and PASS identiﬁes the ﬁles that have in-
correct data, because they descend from both the new
Python library and the calculation routine.
4 Challenges in Layering
Mapping objects between the different layers of abstrac-
tion is only one of the challenges facing layered prove-
nance systems. We identiﬁed six fundamental challenges
for a layered provenance architecture:
Interfacing Between Provenance-Aware Systems:
The manner in which different provenance-aware sys-
tems stack is not ﬁxed. A workﬂow engine might in-
voke a provenance-aware Python program (see Section
6.4)inoneinstanceandinanotherinstancebeinvokedby
it. Thus, provenance-aware components must be able to
both accept and generate messages that transmit prove-
nance. We designed a single universal API appropriate
for communication among PASSv2 components and also
among different provenance systems. It took several iter-
ations to develop an API that was both general and sim-
ple; we discuss the resulting Disclosed Provenance API
(DPAPI) in Section 5.2.
Object Identity: As mentioned earlier, objects may
be tangible at one layer and invisible at another. Imagine
tracking provenance in a browser, as in Section 6.3. It
would be useful to track each browser session as an in-
dependent entity. However, browser sessions do not exist
as objects in the ﬁle system, so it is not obvious how to
express a dependence between a browser page and a ﬁle
downloaded from it. We show how the DPAPI makes ob-
jects from one layer visible to other layers and how the
distributor lets us manage objects that are not manifest
at a particular layer in Section 5.5.
Consistency: Provenance is a form of metadata; we
need to deﬁne and enforce consistency semantics be-
tween the data and its metadata, so users can make ap-
propriate use of it. The DPAPI bundles data and prove-
nance together to achieve this consistency and our lay-
ered ﬁle system, Lasagna (Section 5.6), maintains this
consistency on disk.
Cycles: In earlier work, we discussed the challenge
of detecting and removing cycles in PASSv1 [21]. This
problem becomes even more complicated in a layered
environment. Since there are objects that appear at one
layer and not at others, we may need to create relation-
ships between objects that exist in different layers, and
then detect and remove cycles that these relationships in-
troduce. In Section 5.4, we discuss how the analyzer
performs cross-layer cycle detection.
Query: Collecting provenance is not particularly
valuable if we cannot make it available to a user or ad-
ministrator in a useful fashion. We shadowed several
computational science users to understand what types
of queries they might ask a provenance system. Af-
ter struggling through three generations of query lan-
guages for provenance, we incorporated the input from
our users and derived the following list of requirements
for a provenance query language [16]:
 The basic model should be paths through graphs;
 Paths should be ﬁrst-class language level objects;
 Path matching should be by regular expressions
over graph edges; and
 The language needs sub-queries and aggregation.
Query languages for semi-structured data proved the
best match; our query language PQL (Path Query Lan-
guage) derives from one of these. Section 5.7 provides a
brief overview.
Security: While there has been research showing the
use of provenance for auditing and enhancing security
[13], there has been little work on security controls for
theprovenance itself. The fundamentalprovenancesecu-
rity problem is that provenance and the data it describes
do not necessarily share the same access control. There
is no universally correct rule that dictates which of the
two (data or provenance) requires stronger control. For
example, consider a report generated by aggregating the
health information of patients suffering a certain ailment.
While the report (the data) can be accessible to the pub-
lic, the ﬁles that were used to generate the report (the
provenance) must not be. The provenance must be more
tightly controlled than the data. Conversely, a document
producedbyagovernmentpanel(thedata)mightbeclas-
siﬁed, butthemembershipofthecommitteeandtheiden-
tities of all participants in brieﬁngs (the provenance) may
nonetheless be entirely public. The data carries stronger
access control than the provenance. Creating an access
control model for provenance is outside the scope of thisFigure 2: PASSv2 Architecture
paper; however, a related paper presents an in-depth dis-
cussion of the problem and our approach to solving it
[4].
5 Architecture
We begin with a high level overview that introduces the
main components of the PASSv2 system. Then we ex-
plain each component of the system in detail and show
how it addresses the challenges discussed above.
5.1 Overview
From a user perspective, PASSv2 is an operating
system that collects provenance invisibly. Application
developers can also use it to develop provenance-aware
applications. Figure 2 shows the seven main components
of the PASSv2 system. These are:
libpass: libpass is a library that exports the DPAPI to
user-level. Application developers develop provenance-
aware applications by augmenting their code to collect
provenance and then issuing DPAPI calls to libpass.
Interceptor: The interceptor intercepts system calls and
passes information to the observer.
Observer: The observer translates system call events
to provenance records. For example, when a process P
reads a ﬁle A, the observer generates a record P ! A,
indicating that P depends on A. Hence, together the
observer and the interceptor generate provenance.
Analyzer: The analyzer processes the stream of prove-
nance records and eliminates duplicates and ensures that
cyclic dependencies do not arise.
Distributor: The distributor caches provenance for ob-
jects that are not persistent from the kernel’s perspective,
such as pipes, processes and application-speciﬁc objects
(e.g., a browser session or data set) until they need to be
materialized on disk.
Lasagna: Lasagna is the provenance-aware ﬁle system
that stores provenance records along with the data.
Internally, it writes the provenance to a log. The log
format ensures consistency between the provenance and
data appearing on disk.
Waldo: Waldo is a user-level daemon that reads prove-
nance records from the log and stores them in a database.
Waldo is also responsible for accessing the database on
behalf of the query engine.
5.2 Disclosed Provenance API (DPAPI)
The DPAPI is the central API inside PASSv2. It al-
lows transfer of provenance both among the compo-
nents of the system and between layers. Applications
use the DPAPI to send (“disclose”) provenance to the
kernel. The same interface is used to send prove-
nance to the ﬁle system. The DPAPI consists of six
calls: pass_read, pass_write, pass_freeze,
pass_mkobj, pass_reviveobj, and pass_sync
and two additional concepts: the pnode number and the
provenance record.
A pnode number is a unique ID assigned to an object
at creation time. It is a handle for the object’s prove-
nance, akin to an inode number, but never recycled. A
provenance record is a structure containing a single unit
ofprovenance: anattribute/valuepair, wheretheattribute
is an identiﬁer and the value might be a plain value (in-
teger, string, etc.) or a cross-reference to another object.
Provenance records may contain ancestry information,
records of data ﬂows, or identity information.
The pass_read and pass_write operations are
like read and write but are provenance-aware. This
ensures that provenance and data move together, provid-
ing consistency of provenance and data as required by
Section 4.
The pass_read call returns both the data requested
and the exact identity of what was read: the ﬁle’s pnode
number and version as of the moment of the read. This
ensures that applications or other higher layers can con-
struct provenance records that accurately describe what
they read, also a critical component of consistency.
The pass_write call takes both a data buffer and
a “bundle” of provenance records that describe the data.
A provenance bundle is an array of object handles and
records, each potentially describing a different object.
The complete provenance for a block of data written to
a ﬁle might involve many objects (e.g., several processesand pipes in a shell pipeline). This organization allows
all of the separate objects to be sent as a single unit.
Cycle-breaking sometimes requires creating new ver-
sions of objects. In a layered system, versions must
be handled at the bottom level (the storage system),
but cycle-breaking may occur at any level. The
pass_freeze call breaks cycles by requesting a new
version.
As discussed in Section 4, provenance-aware applica-
tions may need to represent objects, such as browser ses-
sions, data sets, or program variables, that do not map
to a particular ﬁle system object. The pass_mkobj
call allows applications to create such objects. These
objects are referenced like ﬁles, with ﬁle handles. The
objects can also be used to relate names/objects at one
level to names/objects at another level. A system at any
layer can create objects using pass_mkobj and create
dependencies between its objects and objects at differ-
ent layers of abstraction by issuing pass_write calls.
Users can then issue queries using the name in the most
convenient abstraction layer (e.g., ﬁlename) and PASSv2
can retrieve the appropriate objects across the layers us-
ing these dependencies.
We initially designed the objects returned by
pass_mkobj to be transient and applications had
no means to access these objects again after clos-
ing them. However, when developing provenance-
aware applications, we discovered occasions where we
needed to access these objects. Hence, we added the
pass_reviveobj call that takes a pnode number and
version and returns an object previously created via
pass_mkobj.
By default, the provenance associated with an object
returned via pass_mkobj is not ﬂushed to disk unless
it becomes a part of the ancestry of a persistent object
on a PASS-enabled volume. This is correct behavior for
purely transient objects with no descendants (e.g., pro-
cesses), but it would lose objects that exist only at lay-
ers above PASS. Applications can use the pass_sync
function to make persistent provenance associated with
an object created via pass_mkobj even if is not in the
ancestry of a persistent PASS-volume object.
Applications link against libpass to use the user-
level DPAPI to record provenance. Such applications
are provenance-aware. The DPAPI enables an arbitrary
number of layers of provenance-aware applications. For
example, we can construct a system with ﬁve layers
using a provenance-aware Python application that uses
a provenance-aware Python library, both of which ex-
ecute on a provenance-aware Python interpreter. That
provenance-aware Python interpreter might then use a
PA-NFS utilizing PASSv2. Note that the provenance-
aware library and provenance-aware interpreter both ac-
cept DPAPI calls from higher layers and issue DPAPI
calls to lower layers.
5.3 Provenance Generation
Provenance generation involves two system components:
the interceptor and observer. The interceptor captures
system call events and reports them to the observer.
The PASSv2 interceptor handles the following system
calls: execve, fork, exit, read, readv, write,
writev, mmap, open, and pipe, and the kernel oper-
ation drop_inode. The interceptor is a thin operating
system speciﬁc layer, while the remaining system com-
ponents can be mostly operating system independent.
The observer takes the information it receives from the
interceptor, constructs provenance records, and passes
those records to the analyzer via DPAPI calls. For ex-
ample, when a process issues a read system call, the
observer ﬁrst issues a pass_read on the ﬁle. When
the pass_read returns with the data, pnode, and ver-
sion of the ﬁle, the observer creates a record stating that
the particular version of the ﬁle is an input to the pro-
cess, thereby creating a dependency between the process
and the ﬁle. It then sends the record to the analyzer by
issuing a pass_write with the provenance record, but
no data. When that process then issues a write system
call, the observer creates a record stating that the process
is an input to the written ﬁle and issues a pass_write
containing both this provenance record and the data from
the write system call, thereby creating a dependency
between the process and the ﬁle.
The observer is also the entry point for provenance-
aware applications that use the DPAPI to explicitly dis-
close provenance records to PASSv2. The observer is the
appropriate entry point, since PASS might need to gen-
erate additional provenance records even when an appli-
cation is disclosing provenance. For example, when an
application invokes a pass_write DPAPI call, apart
from the explicit provenance disclosed by the appli-
cation, the observer has to create a record that cap-
tures the dependency between the application and the
ﬁle. The observer converts the provenance that higher-
level provenance-aware applications explicitly disclose
via DPAPI calls into appropriate kernel structures and
passes the records to the analyzer.
5.4 Analyzer
The analyzer eliminates redundant provenance and cy-
cles in the stream of provenance records that it re-
ceives. Programs generally perform I/O in relatively
small blocks (e.g., 4 KB), issuing multiple reads and
writes when manipulating large ﬁles. Each read or
write call causes the observer to emit a new record,
most of which are identical. The analyzer removes suchduplicates. Meanwhile, cycles can occur when multiple
processes are concurrently reading and writing the same
ﬁles. The analyzer prevents cycles by creating new ver-
sions of objects. In PASSv1, we used an algorithm that
maintains a global graph of object dependencies and ex-
plicitly checks for cycles. On detecting a cycle, the algo-
rithm merged all the nodes in the cycle into a single en-
tity. Thisprovedchallenging, andtherewerecaseswhere
we were not able to do this correctly. In PASSv2, we use
a more conservative algorithm, called the cycle avoid-
ance algorithm that uses only an object’s local depen-
dency information to avoid cycles. We discuss and ana-
lyze this algorithm in detail in earlier work [20]. Since
any semantic information that the higher-level applica-
tions disclose to PASSv2 is via objects returned through
pass_mkobj, the analyzer works in a layered environ-
ment without modiﬁcation.
5.5 Distributor
Since processes are ﬁrst-class objects, the system must
track and store their provenance. However, processes
are not by themselves persistent objects residing on a
PASS-enabled volume. Where should their provenance
be stored? Similar issues arise with pipes, ﬁles from non-
PASS volumes, and objects introduced by provenance-
aware applications. In these cases, PASSv2 must se-
lect some PASS-enabled volume on which to store their
provenance. The distributor addresses this issue.
The distributor caches provenance records for all ob-
jects that are not PASS ﬁles. When those objects be-
come part of the ancestry of a persistent object on
a PASS-enabled volume or are explicitly ﬂushed via
pass_sync, the distributor assigns these objects to a
PASS volume (either that of the persistent ancestor or the
one speciﬁed when an object was created) and ﬂushes
the provenance records by issuing a pass_write to
Lasagna.
5.6 Lasagna & Waldo
Lasagna is our provenance-aware ﬁle system that stores
both provenance and data. Lasagna is a stackable ﬁle
system, basedupon theeCryptfs [12] codebase. Lasagna
implementstheDPAPIinterfaceinadditiontotheregular
VFS calls. We implement pass_read, pass_write,
pass_freeze as inode operations and pass_mkobj
and pass_reviveobj as superblock operations.
PASSv1 wrote provenance directly into databases that
provided indexed access to provenance. This arrange-
ment was neither ﬂexible nor scalable, so PASSv2 writes
allprovenancerecordstoalog. Auser-leveldaemonpro-
cess, Waldo, later moves the provenance to a database
and indexes it. When the log ﬁle exceeds a parametrized
maximum size or has been dormant for a parametrized
length of time, the kernel closes the log and creates a
new one. Waldo uses the Linux inotify interface to
monitor this activity, processing and removing log ﬁles.
We use a write-ahead-provenance (WAP) protocol to
ensure that on-disk provenance accurately reﬂects on-
disk data. WAP is analogous to database write-ahead
logging. Enforcing WAP requires that all provenance
records be written to disk before the data they describe.
This eliminates the possibility that unprovenanced data
exists on the disk. In addition, we use transactional struc-
tures in the log along with MD5sums of data so that dur-
ing ﬁle system recovery, we identify any data for which
the provenance is inconsistent. This indicates precisely
the data that was being written to disk at the time of a
crash. Thus, Lasagna’s DPAPI interface along with the
WAP protocol ensures that provenance is consistent with
the data it describes (or, after a crash, inconsistencies are
identiﬁed).
5.7 Querying
Most existing provenance systems use either an XML-
based or a relational representation. We found both lack-
ing. XML has a notion of paths (XPath) but is inherently
tree-structured and does not extend well to graphs. SQL
has no native concept of paths; writing path-like queries
in SQL requires mentally translating the paths into recur-
sive queries, which are themselves expensive and unnat-
ural in a relational environment. It seemed most appro-
priate to ﬁnd a query language that was designed specif-
ically for querying graphs.
The Lore semistructured database project at Stanford
provided us with the Lorel [1] query language and its
“OEM” data model. A semistructured database is one
with no ﬁxed schema; the data model in Lore is that of a
collection of arbitrary objects, some holding values and
some holding tables of named linkages to other objects.
The data types of values and linkages are not ﬁxed, and
the query language is designed accordingly.
The OEM data model is appealing for provenance,
since it naturally represents both graphs and object at-
tributes, and Lorel provides the path-oriented query
model for which we were looking. Unfortunately, we
found that Lorel had several shortcomings. In particu-
lar, it did not support boolean values in the database, its
formal grammar was ambiguous, and there were corner
cases where the semantics were not well deﬁned. We
also needed to extend Lorel to allow traversal of graph
edges in both directions. We present a more in-depth
discussion of these issues in a recent publication [16].
We developed a new query language based on Lorel,
which we call Path Query Language (PQL or “pickle”).
It is speciﬁcally geared to handle our requirements forquerying provenance. PQL’s query model is based on
following paths through an object graph to ﬁnd and re-
trieve data. The typical query returns a set of values.
The general structure of a PQL query is: select outputs
from sources where condition. Sources are path expres-
sions, which represent paths through the graph, outputs
are anything we can compute on paths, and conditions
are boolean predicates like in a SQL query. The PQL
reference manual is available online [15].
The following sample query determines the cause of
the anomaly in the output in the use case described in
Section 3.1.
select Ancestor
from Provenance.file as Atlas
Atlas.input* as Ancestor
where Atlas.name = "atlas-x.gif"
The query returns all the ancestors of one output ﬁle,
atlas-x.gif (by following zero or more input re-
lationships), which will include both the Kepler work-
ﬂow entities and the PASS data for the input ﬁles. PQL
queries, if not posed carefully, can result in information
overload. Pruning the query results to produce more fo-
cused results is an area of ongoing research.
6 Provenance-Aware Applications
The following sections present technical details about
how we implemented provenance collection in a vari-
ety of different provenance-aware layers, and the prove-
nance we collect in each. We conclude this section with a
summary of the lessons learned while constructing these
provenance-aware components. Table 1 summarizes the
provenance collected by each provenance-aware system.
6.1 Provenance-Aware NFS
We implemented provenance-aware NFS using
NFSv4 [26] in Linux 2.6.23.17. Making NFS prove-
nance aware involves addressing two questions: First,
while provenance-aware NFS can leverage the PASSv2
analyzer, should that analyzer reside on the client or
the server? And second, how do we extend the NFSv4
protocol to support the six DPAPI operations?
6.1.1 Cycles vs. NFS
An analyzer must process all the provenance records at
its abstraction layer in order to properly avoid cycles.
Consider a process on an NFS client machine access-
ing data from two different storage servers. The analyzer
must reside at the client, because only there is it possible
to see all relevant provenance records.
Record Type Description
PA-NFS
BEGINTXN Beginning record of a transaction
ENDTXN Terminating record of a transaction
FREEZE Freeze record sent in pass_write
PA-Kepler
TYPE Type of object: set to OPERATOR
NAME Name of the operator
PARAMS Operator parameters
INPUT Dependency between operators
PA-links
TYPE Type of object: set to SESSION
VISITED_URL Session and URL dependency
FILE_URL File and URL dependency
CURRENT_URL URL user was viewing while
download was initiated
INPUT File and Session dependency
PA-Python
TYPE Type of object: e.g., FUNCTION
NAME object name (e.g., method name)
INPUT method input and invocation
dependency or invocation and output
dependency
Table 1: Provenance records collected by each
provenance-aware application.
Next, consider two programs running on different
clients accessing a single server. By the same logic, the
analyzer must reside on the server, because only there
can it see all related provenance records.
Finally, combine these two scenarios: two client pro-
grams each accessing ﬁles from two different ﬁle servers.
In this case, we need analyzers on both clients and
servers.
This means that in general we must have an analyzer
on every client and also an analyzer on every server;
this in turn means that the client instance of the analyzer
must be able to stack on top of the server instance, which
meansthattheinputandoutputdatarepresentationsmust
be the same. This requirement is easily satisﬁed as all
the components in PASSv2, including the client and the
server, communicate via the DPAPI. In fact, it was pre-
cisely this observation that motivated layering and the
use of the DPAPI as a universal interface.
6.1.2 DPAPI in NFS
pass_write: Supporting pass_write requires that we
transmit provenance with data to enforce consistency.
Accordingly, we created an NFS operation analogous to
the local pass_write, called OP_PASSWRITE, that
transmits both data and provenance to the server. As long
as the combined data and provenance size is less than theNFSv4 client’s block size (typically 64 KB in NFSv4),
this approach is sufﬁcient.
Unfortunately, not all data and provenance packets
satisfy this constraint. In these cases, we use NFS
transactions to encapsulate a collection of operations
that must be handled atomically by the server. To
support transactions, we introduced two new opera-
tions, OP_BEGINTXN and OP_PASSPROV, and two
new provenance record types, BEGINTXN and ENDTXN.
First, we invoke an OP_BEGINTXN operation to ob-
tain a transaction ID from the exported PASS vol-
ume. We record the transaction ID in a BEGINTXN
record at the server. Then, we send the provenance
records to the server in 64 KB chunks, using a se-
ries of OP_PASSPROV operations, each identiﬁed by
the transaction ID acquired by OP_BEGINTXN. Finally,
we invoke an OP_PASSWRITE operation that trans-
mits the data along with a single ENDTXN record. The
ENDTXN record contains the transaction ID obtained in
OP_BEGINTXN and signals the end of that transaction.
A corresponding ENDTXN record is written to the log at
the server.
We considered an alternate implementation that ob-
tains a mandatory lock on the ﬁle, writes the provenance,
and then writes the data as a separate operation. This ap-
proachwouldhaveprovidedthecouplingbetweenprove-
nance and data; however, it does not allow us to recover
from a client crash. If the client wrote the provenance,
crashed before sending the data, and then came back up,
there is no way for the server to determine that the prove-
nance must be discarded. Our implementation solves this
problem, because the transaction ID enables the server’s
Waldo daemon to identify the orphaned provenance.
pass_read: For NFS pass_read, we introduced a
new operation OP_PASSREAD, which returns both the
requested data and its pnode number and version.
pass_freeze: We send pass_freeze opera-
tions to the server as a provenance record type in
OP_PASSWRITE. When the analyzer at the client is-
sues a pass_freeze, the client increments the ver-
sion locally and attaches a freeze record to the ﬁle. The
client can then return the correct version of the ﬁle on a
pass_read without a trip to the server. Later, when
the client sends the ﬁle’s provenance to the server with
an OP_PASSWRITE, the server processes the freeze
records, incrementing its version number accordingly.
We implement freeze as a record type instead of an
operation because operations may arrive at the server
out of order. pass_freeze is order-sensitive with
respect to pass_write. pass_freeze breaks cy-
cles in the records that are about to be written with a
pass_write and an out of order arrival can result in a
failure to break cycles. Making pass_freeze a record
type couples pass_freeze with pass_write and
avoids the problem.
Due to the close-to-open consistency model that NFS
supports, two different clients can open the same ver-
sion of a ﬁle and concurrently make modiﬁcations to it.
Hence, our approach of versioning at the client and up-
dating versions at the server can lead to version branch-
ing, where two clients create independent copies of an
object with the same version. This has not caused any
problems in ourexisting applications, and given theover-
all lack of precise consistency semantics in NFS, we do
not expect it to be problematic for existing applications.
pass_mkobj: We added a new operation called
OP_PASSMKOBJ that returns a unique pnode referenc-
ing the object in future interactions. The client then con-
structs an in-memory anonymous inode that has a refer-
ence to the pnode and exports the inode to user-level as a
ﬁle.
We could have implemented pass_mkobj by creat-
ing a ﬁle handle at the server and returning it to the client.
Theclientwouldthenusethehandletowriteprovenance.
However, thisapproachwouldmakeitdifﬁculttorecover
from either a server or client crash. The advantage of our
approachisthattheserveronlyneedsenoughstatetover-
ify that the pnode is a valid on pass_reviveobj and
requires no complicated recovery. If the server crashes
and comes back up, the client can continue to use the pn-
ode as though the crash never happened, as the pnode is
just a number. Similarly, if the client crashes, the server
does not have to clean up state as it has only allocated a
(cheap) pnode number to the client.
pass_reviveobj: We added a new operation called
OP_PASSREVIVEOBJ that veriﬁes that the given pn-
ode number is valid and returns an anonymous inode as
we do for pass_mkobj.
pass_sync: This is implemented by invoking the
OP_PASSPROV operation. When the provenance ex-
ceeds 64KB, we encapsulate the operation in a transac-
tion as we do for pass_write.
6.2 Provenance-Aware Kepler
Kepler records provenance for all communication be-
tween workﬂow operators, recording these events ei-
ther in a text ﬁle or relational database. We added a
third recording option: transmitting the provenance into
PASSv2 via the DPAPI. This integration was simple. We
implemented methods in Kepler’s provenance recording
interface that translate Kepler’s provenance events into
explicit ancestor-descendant relationships.
We create a PASS object for every workﬂow opera-
tor using pass_mkobj and set its properties, such as
NAME, TYPE, and PARAMS, which specify the names
and values of its parameters (such as “ﬁleName” or “con-
ﬁrmOverwrite” for a ﬁle output operator). When an op-erator produces a result, Kepler notiﬁes our recording in-
terface with its event mechanism. Upon receipt of the
event, we add an ancestry relationship between this op-
erator and every recipient of the message by issuing a
pass_write call that records the ancestry between the
sender and the recipient. This is the only one of Kepler’s
recording operations that needs to send data to PASSv2.
Unfortunately, the recording interface does not pro-
vide methods to generate provenance for reading or writ-
ing ﬁles or downloading data from the Internet. In-
stead, Kepler knows about data sink and source opera-
tors, which open and close ﬁles. We modiﬁed the Kepler
routines used by these operators to infer the ﬁles that are
being read/written, linking Kepler’s provenance to that in
PASSv2.
6.3 Provenance-Aware links
We chose to add provenance collection to version 0.98 of
links, a text-based browser, as it had the simplest code
base of those browsers we examined. We are currently
exploring provenance collection in a Firefox [19].
A PA-browser can capture semantic information that
is invisible to PASS, such as:
 The URL of any ﬁle that a user downloads using the
browser;
 The web page a user was examining when she initi-
ated a download;
 The sequence of web pages a user visited before
downloading a ﬁle; and
 The set of pages that were active concurrently.
We group provenance by session, as it represents
a logical task performed by a user. On session cre-
ation, we create a PASS object that represents it (us-
ing pass_mkobj) and record the object TYPE (using
pass_write). Whenever a user visits a site, we gen-
erate a VISITED_URL record that describes the depen-
dency between the session and the URL and record it by
issuing the DPAPI call pass_write. These records
identify the sequence of URLs that a user visited before
downloading a ﬁle.
Each time the browser downloads a ﬁle, we generate
three records. An INPUT record captures the depen-
dency between the ﬁle and the session, connecting the
ﬁle to the sequence of URLs visited during the session,
before initiating the download. A FILE_URL record
captures the URL of the ﬁle itself. A CURRENT_URL
record captures the dependency between the ﬁle and the
page the user was viewing when she decided to down-
load the ﬁle. We replace the write that the browser
issues to record the ﬁle on disk with a pass_write
that transmits the data and the three provenance records
to PASSv2.
6.4 Provenance-Aware Python Apps
We discovered that a colleague had written a set of wrap-
pers to track provenance in Python applications. His goal
was to explicitly identify relationships between input and
output ﬁles using Python scripts that read in a large num-
ber of data ﬁles, but used only a subset of them.
To make the Python analysis program provenance-
aware, we created Python bindings for our DPAPI inter-
face. We also wrap objects, modules, basic types, and
output ﬁles with code that creates PASSv2 objects repre-
senting our Python objects (using pass_mkobj), inter-
cepts method invocations, and then records the relation-
ships between the objects. By wrapping a few modules
and objects we record the information ﬂow pertaining to
those objects and methods and relate them to the ﬁles
they eventually affect. For every object, we record the
object TYPE (for example, FUNCTION) and the object
NAME. For modules and methods, we add an intercept
for each method so we can connect method invocations
to their inputs and outputs. On every method invocation,
we issue DPAPI pass_write calls to record INPUT
records describing the dependencies between each input
and its method invocation and between the method invo-
cation and each of its outputs.
6.5 Summary and Lessons Learned
While provenance-aware applications are generally use-
ful and many developers develop ad hoc solutions to the
problems they solve, the ability to integrate such solu-
tions with system-level approaches increases the value
of both the system-level provenance and the application-
level provenance. Our system has a simple architecture
and API that enables such an integration. We now dis-
cuss some of the lessons we learned.
Our experience with links, Kepler, and Python led
us to the following guidelines for making applications
provenance-aware. First, application developers have to
identify the provenance they want to collect. Next, they
have to replace read calls with pass_read calls and
write calls with pass_write calls, obtaining and for-
warding provenance to the layers around them. In or-
der to record semantic provenance, application develop-
ers can create objects using pass_mkobj and record
such provenance via pass_write calls on those ob-
jects. They can then link the semantic provenance with
the system objects by creating appropriate records and
storing them via pass_write calls. Finally, layers that
are a substrate to higher level applications (like an inter-
preter) must export the DPAPI. If they do not export the
DPAPI, the applications cannot layer provenance on top
of them.
Itisnottrivialtoextendexistingcomplexapplications,which were not designed to collect provenance, to make
them provenance aware. We observe this in our ongoing
work with Firefox. In Firefox, interesting provenance
events such as page loads, bookmarks, etc. occur in the
user interface modules. However, the I/O manipulation
events such as cache and ﬁle writes occur in completely
different modules. Connecting provenance collected in
the UI modules to data writes in the I/O modules entails a
signiﬁcant amount of re-engineering of Firefox modules
and interfaces. We are currently working on this.
Considering that operating systems are, to this day,
introducing new system calls, we expect the DPAPI to
evolve over time. It has continued to evolve over the
course of the project and this paper. As we noted in
Section 5.2, we initially designed the objects returned by
pass_mkobj to be transient. However, while working
on Firefox provenance collection, we discovered that we
needed to revive these objects. For example, in Firefox,
we create an object per active session. Firefox stores the
sessions to disk and restores them when the user restarts
the browser. In this scenario, the application needs to
revive the objects used to record each session’s prove-
nance so as to record further provenance. Hence, in or-
der to support such scenarios, we extended the DPAPI to
include pass_reviveobj.
We initially believed that the Python wrappers we built
were sufﬁcient to enable provenance-aware Python ap-
plications. We later realized that while we could wrap
functions, we lost provenance across built-in operators.
In retrospect, what we discovered with Python was the
difference between building a provenance-aware system
and provenance-aware applications. By wrapping func-
tion calls in Python, we make an application provenance-
aware, as we did for links and Kepler. Making Python
itself provenance-aware would require modifying the
Python interpreter, as we modiﬁed the operating sys-
tem to make it provenance-aware. While an interesting
project, we have left that undertaking for future research.
7 Performance Evaluation
While the main contribution of this work is in the new
capabilities available from the system, we wanted to ver-
ify that these capabilities do not impose excessive over-
heads. There are two concerns: the execution time over-
head due to the additional work done to collect prove-
nance and the space overhead for storing provenance.
We evaluate these overheads using ﬁve applications
representative of a broad range of workloads: 1) Linux
compile, in which we unpack and build Linux kernel ver-
sion 2.6.19.1. This represents a CPU intensive workload;
2) Postmark, that simulates the operation of an email
server. We ran 1500 transactions with ﬁle sizes rang-
ing from 4 KB to 1 MB, with 10 subdirectories and 1500
ﬁles. This benchmark is representative of an I/O inten-
sive workload; 3) Mercurial activity benchmark, where
we evaluate the overhead a user experiences in a nor-
mal development scenario. We start with a vanilla Linux
2.6.19.1kernelandapply, aspatches, eachofthechanges
thatwecommittedtoourownMercurial-managedsource
tree; 4) Blast, a biological workload used to ﬁnd pro-
tein sequences in a species that are closely related to the
protein sequences in another species. The workload for-
mats two input data ﬁles with a tool called formatdb,
then processes the two ﬁles with Blast, and then mas-
sages the output data with a series of Perl scripts; and 5)
A PA-Kepler workload, that parses tabular data, extracts
values, and reformats it using a user-speciﬁed expres-
sion. The PA-Kepler workload, when located on a PA-
NFS volume, is similar to the situation presented in Sec-
tion 1, where provenance collection is integrated across
three layers.
We ran two batches of experiments: one comparing
PASSv2 to vanilla ext3 (in ordered mode) and another
on comparing provenance-aware NFS (PA-NFS) to NFS
exporting ext3 (also in ordered mode). We ran all local
benchmarks on a 3GHz Pentium 4 machine with 512MB
of RAM, an 80GB 7200 RPM Western Digital Caviar
WD800JB hard drive and with a kernel (Vanilla/PASS)
based on Linux 2.6.23.17. For experiments involving
NFS, we used the previous machine as the server and a
2.8GHz 2 CPU Opteron 254 machine with 3GB of RAM
as the client. The client machine has the same software
conﬁguration as the server.
PASSv2 Elapsed Time Results: Table 2 shows the
elapsed time overheads. The general pattern we observed
is that the elapsed times are affected when provenance
writes interfere with the workload’s regular writes. The
Mercurial activity benchmark has the highest elapsed
time overhead of 23.1% despite having minimal space
overhead. This is because patch performs many meta-
data operations (it creates a temporary ﬁle, merges data
from the patch ﬁle and the original ﬁle into the tempo-
rary ﬁle, and ﬁnally renames the temporary ﬁle). The
provenance writes interfere with patch’s metadata I/O,
leading to extra seeks, which increase overhead. The
Linux kernel compile has an overhead of 15.6% due to
provenance writes. Postmark has an overhead of 11.5%,
and the overheads, unlike the former two benchmarks,
are due to the double buffering in Lasagna (stackable ﬁle
systems cache both their data pages and lower ﬁle system
data pages). Blast and PA-Kepler are heavily CPU bound
and hence their elapsed time are minimally affected due
to provenance writes.
PA-NFS Elapsed Time Results: The PA-NFS
elapsed time overheads are lower for Linux compile
and Mercurial activity benchmarks compared to PASSv2
overheads, as the additional delay introduced by the net-Benchmark Ext3 PASSv2 Overhead NFS PA-NFS Overhead
Linux Compile 1746 2018 15.6% 3320 3353 11.0%
Postmark 453 505 11.5% 636 743 16.8%
Mercurial Activity 614 756 23.1% 2842 3089 8.7%
Blast 69 69.5 0.7% 52 53 1.9%
PA-Kepler 1246 1264 1.4% 160 164 2.5%
Table 2: Elapsed time overheads (in seconds).
Benchmark Ext3 Provenance Provenance+Indexes
Linux Compile 1287.9 88.9 (6.9%) 236.8 (18.4%)
Postmark 1289.5 0.8 (0.1%) 1.7 (0.1%)
Mercurial Activity 858.7 15.4 (1.8%) 28.9 (3.4%)
Blast 5.6 0.1 (1.1%) 0.2 (3.8%)
PA-Kepler 3.5 0.2 (4.7%) 0.5 (14.2%)
Table 3: Space overheads (in MB) for PASSv2. The space overheads for PA-NFS are similar.
work round trips affect both NFS and PA-NFS equally.
The Postmark overheads, though reasonable, are higher
in PA-NFS compared to PASSv2. Our experiments con-
ﬁrm that out of 16.8% overhead that Postmark incurs for
PA-NFS, 14.8% is due to the fact that Lasagna is imple-
mented as a stackable ﬁle system. The Blast and PA-
Kepler overheads remain minimal even in the PA-NFS
case.
Space Overheads: Table 3 shows the provenance
database space overhead and the total space overheads
(provenance database and indexes) for PASSv2. The
overheads are computed as a percentage of the Ext3
space utilization. Overall, the provenance database over-
heads are minimal with all overheads being less than
7%. The total space overheads are reasonable with Linux
compile having the highest overhead at 18.4%. PA-
Kepler combines both system provenance and applica-
tion provenance and has a total space overhead of 14.2%.
For the rest of the benchmarks, the space overhead is less
than 4%. The space overheads for PA-NFS as the over-
heads are similar to the overheads in PASSv2.
8 Related Work
Several systems have looked at propagating taint infor-
mation along with the data in order to debug applications
or to detect security violations [22, 30]. These systems
are, however, extremely slow as they track information
ﬂow at a ﬁne granularity and hence can never be used
in production systems. PASSv2 monitors only system
call events, which is much less expensive. The drawback
is that the information collected by PASSv2 can be less
accurate; but as we have shown in the use cases, it is
valuable nonetheless.
X-Trace [7] is a research prototype built to diagnose
problems in network applications that span multiple pro-
tocol layers and administrative domains. X-Trace’s ap-
proach is similar to ours in that it integrates information
from multiple layers in the system stack. The higher
layer generates a “taint” that is propagated through the
layers along with the data. The generated debug meta-
data is not sent with the data, but is instead sent out of
band to a destination. Hence the interface between lay-
ers can be much more limited compared to the DPAPI
in PASSv2. Furthermore, X-Trace does not need to deal
with cycles as the PASSv2 analyzer does.
Another class of systems that maintain dependencies
are software build systems such as Vesta [14]. These sys-
tems need the initial dependencies be speciﬁed manually.
Build systems maintain dependencies after those depen-
dencies have been speciﬁed; PASS derives dependencies
based upon program execution. As a result, while ex-
traordinarily useful for software development, they ig-
nore the central PASS challenge: automatically generat-
ing the derivation rules as a system runs.
Chanda et. al. [5] present a mechanism to use causal
information ﬂow to introduce new functionality. For ex-
ample, one can send process priority along with data to
a socket. On receiving the data and the causal metadata
(priority), the server increases the priority for processing
this data. This mechanism is complementary to the ideas
we have explored in this work.
9 Conclusions
We have presented a provenance-aware storage system
that permits integration of provenance across multiple
layers of abstraction, ranging from Python applications
to network-attached storage. This integration requires a
layered architecture that dictates how provenance, data,and versions must ﬂow through the system. The archi-
tecture has proved versatile enough to facilitate integra-
tion with a variety of applications and NFS, providing
functionality not available in systems that cannot inte-
grate provenance across different layers of abstraction.
We have presented several use cases illustrating what
kinds of functionality this layering enables. The use
cases show efﬁcacy in a variety of areas, such as mal-
ware tracking and scientiﬁc data processing. Finally,
we demonstrated an end-to-end system encompass-
ing provenance-aware applications and network-attached
storage, imposing reasonable space and time overheads
ranging between 1% and 23%.
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